Nigeria has every reason to ask a difficult question: if our waters have become significantly safer, why are vessels sailing to Nigeria still associated with war-risk exposure?
For years, piracy and maritime insecurity were legitimate reasons for international concern over the Gulf of Guinea. Nigeria was at the centre of that problem. But the security reality has changed dramatically. However, what has not changed, is Nigeria’s international risk classification. This is no longer a matter for lamentation. It is a matter of economic diplomacy, strategic representation and national interest.
First, a controversy must be cleared up. Nigeria has, at different times, been described as having been “delisted” from piracy-prone or high-risk maritime classifications. In March 2023, then Chief of Naval Staff, Vice Admiral Awwal Gambo, announced that Nigeria’s removal from the International Maritime Bureau’s list of piracy-prone countries had contributed to a reduction in the risk premium paid by vessels coming into Nigeria. NIMASA also announced Nigeria’s removal from the International Bargaining Forum’s list of designated risk maritime nations.
But these developments should not be confused with removal from the Lloyd’s Market Association’s Joint War Committee (JWC) Listed Areas. The distinction is crucial. The JWC publishes geographical areas considered to present enhanced risks. Ships entering listed areas may require additional war-risk coverage. The JWC does not prescribe a particular premium; actual rates are determined between insurers, brokers and clients.
And here is the uncomfortable fact Nigeria must confront: Nigeria remains on the JWC Listed Areas. The JWC reviewed its list again in July 2026, and its current list remains accessible as JWLA-034. The March 2026 JWC list explicitly included Nigeria, alongside Benin, Cabo Delgado, Eritrea, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Togo and the broader Gulf of Guinea area.
Therefore, claims that Nigeria has generally been “removed from war-risk insurance” are, at best, incomplete. Nigeria has achieved important delistings from other maritime risk classifications, but it has not secured removal from the JWC Listed Areas. That should concern every policymaker interested in making Nigeria a competitive maritime economy.
Nigeria did not achieve its remarkable improvement in maritime security by making noise. It took deliberate investment, institutional architecture and inter-agency coordination. One of the most important milestones was the Deep Blue Project under the leadership of former NIMASA Director-General, Dr Bashir Jamoh. The project strengthened the operational relationship between NIMASA, the Nigerian Navy and other security institutions, including the Nigerian Air Force. That architecture mattered. It created a mechanism through which intelligence, surveillance, patrol, air assets, special mission vessels and rapid-response capabilities could work together. The results became increasingly visible as piracy incidents declined.
The International Maritime Organization has acknowledged the progress made in reducing piracy across the Gulf of Guinea. In 2025, NIMASA reported zero piracy incidents in Nigerian waters, while the IMO Secretary-General commended Nigeria’s maritime security gains and described the Deep Blue Project as a model for regional cooperation.
By May 2026, NIMASA Director-General, Dr Dayo Mobereola, said Nigeria had sustained four consecutive years without a piracy attack. These are not merely Nigerian claims. There is international evidence that the maritime security situation has improved dramatically. So why should the country continue to carry the burden of an old risk perception? Nigeria must now move beyond celebrating its security achievements internally. It must take those achievements to the people who influence international maritime risk perception.
The Lloyd’s Market Association has indicated that the JWC works with government personnel, security firms and shipping companies and relies on independent security advice. This means Nigeria has an opportunity to present evidence, challenge outdated assumptions and demand a formal review.
This is where NIMASA must demonstrate leadership. The Director-General should personally lead a structured diplomatic and technical campaign involving the Ministry of Marine and Blue Economy, Nigerian Navy, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nigerian Ports Authority, Nigerian Shippers’ Council, ship owners, insurers and international shipping associations.
Nigeria should prepare a comprehensive Maritime Security Delisting Dossier containing verified piracy statistics, naval patrol records, Deep Blue Project deployments, arrests and prosecutions, incident-free periods, intelligence capabilities, regional cooperation and independent assessments from the IMO and other credible maritime bodies. The argument must be evidence-based: the risk profile has changed; therefore, the classification should change.
There is another uncomfortable issue. What exactly is Nigeria’s representation doing at the International Maritime Organization and within the wider international maritime diplomatic space, to translate our security achievements into commercial benefits?
Some stakeholders have recalled the period when Dr William Azuh was associated with Nigeria’s IMO representation and argued that Nigeria’s voice and influence appeared more visible.
Whether every comparison is fair or not, the question deserves an answer. International representation should not be ceremonial. It should produce outcomes. Nigeria should have maritime diplomats and technical representatives who understand not only IMO conventions, but also the commercial consequences of international maritime classifications, insurance decisions, port competitiveness and shipping costs.
If Pakistan can build a case and successfully negotiate its removal from the JWC Listed Areas, Nigeria must ask why it cannot do the same. Pakistan provides an instructive example. After remaining on the JWC list for about 25 years, Pakistan’s territorial waters were removed in July 2026, following a government-led effort. Its maritime authorities presented their case to Lloyd’s, challenged outdated risk perceptions and pursued the matter at the highest levels.
Pakistan’s government said the decision would reduce war-risk premiums and shipping costs and improve the competitiveness of Karachi, Port Qasim and Gwadar. That is the lesson Nigeria should learn. Delisting does not happen merely because a country becomes safer. Someone must make the case.
The economic implications are too important to ignore. War-risk charges and related insurance costs become part of the cost of doing business. Shipping lines do not absorb every additional cost. Much of it eventually reflects in freight rates, cargo charges and, ultimately, the prices paid by Nigerian consumers and businesses.
NIMASA itself has previously campaigned for the removal of war-risk insurance on Nigeria-bound cargoes, arguing that improved security should translate into lower costs. Nigeria is simultaneously talking about growing the blue economy, attracting investment, improving port competitiveness and positioning itself as a regional maritime hub. It therefore makes little sense to invest heavily in maritime security and then fail to secure the commercial dividend from that investment.
The JWC’s position should be treated not as an insult, but as a challenge. Its assessment acknowledges that piracy incidents in the Gulf of Guinea have significantly decreased since 2021, even though attacks and crew kidnappings remain a concern. Nigeria therefore cannot simply demand delisting on the basis that piracy has disappeared completely.
Instead, Nigeria must demonstrate that the risk associated specifically with Nigerian waters no longer justifies maintaining the country as a listed area. And it must do so professionally, persistently, internationally and convincingly. Nigeria should immediately establish a high-level War-Risk Delisting Task Force with a clear mandate, measurable targets and a timeline for engagement with the JWC, Lloyd’s, international insurers, ship owners and relevant maritime organisations.
Our security agencies have done their part. The Deep Blue Project created an architecture that helped transform Nigeria’s maritime security profile. The Navy, NIMASA and other partners have sustained the gains. Now, the diplomatic and commercial arms of government must finish the job. Nigeria has cleaned up its ‘maritime security house’ considerably. It is time to ensure that the world recognises this. We must not merely tell ourselves that our waters are safe. We must make the international insurance market acknowledge it. The next victory in Nigeria’s maritime security story, should therefore not be another patrol, interception or security conference. It should be Nigeria’s formal removal from the JWC Listed Areas — and the reduction of the unnecessary insurance burden that follows Nigeria’s continued stay on the List of piracy prone nations. That is the commercial dividend of huge investments in maritime security and Nigeria must demand it.
