Following recent revelation by the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) about the use of Gulf of Guinea maritime routes by terrorist groups like Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), industry stakeholders and security experts have attributed the growing security threats to years of neglect in the country’s maritime security architecture.
While they criticized the Nigerian government’s misplaced priorities in managing the country’s maritime domain, they noted that Nigeria continues to underinvest in maritime security technology, leaving its vast coastal waters vulnerable to criminals.
Shipping Position Daily recalls that recently the UNOCT in an high-level meeting in Lagos organized in collaboration with the Nigeria Immigration Service and supported by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, highlighted the increasing convergence of terrorism, piracy, oil theft, and organized crime in the region. Chief of the Countering Terrorist Travel Section at UNOCT, Rocco Messina specifically warned that the region is facing a growing convergence of terrorism, piracy, oil theft, and organized crime, posing serious security risks.
But, ia chat with our correspondent last week, former Senior Special Assistant to ex-President Goodluck Jonathan on Maritime Affairs, Gbenga Leke Oyewole described the UN’s disclosure as a reflection of longstanding realities in Nigeria’s maritime domain. He attributed the growing security gap to the country’s failure to prioritize technology-driven surveillance and enforcement along its coastal borders.
Rather than investing in advanced systems used in other nations, Oyewole said Nigerian authorities have continued to rely on outdated equipment, leaving large areas of the country’s waters poorly monitored. According to him, much of the responsibility lies with agencies tasked with maritime security that have shifted focus from enforcement to revenue generation.
Oyewole criticized the failure of Nigeria’s maritime security apparatus, particularly the underutilization of surveillance technologies and the misplaced roles of key security agencies. He pointedly blamed the Nigeria Customs Service, saying it has drifted from its security mandate in pursuit of revenue generation. As a result, he stated that the deployment of personnel tends to favor revenue-generating operations, while critical security areas such as tanker inspections are overlooked.
He recalled a previous government effort in which, following his advice to the Presidency, authorities seized a vessel carrying 450 kilograms of cocaine within two weeks, a clear indicator of what could be achieved with focused attention on maritime surveillance.
These ships, he noted, have the capacity to conceal large quantities of arms, ammunition, narcotics, and trafficked persons in their void spaces—posing a serious risk to national and regional security. The expert also drew attention to the loopholes in port clearance and documentation procedures, warning that vessels loitering in Nigerian waters before proceeding to other countries could use Nigerian-issued documents to shield their true intentions. In such scenarios, Nigeria risks being held accountable for incidents it did not directly orchestrate.
Oyewole further clarified the limited mandates of agencies like the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) and the Nigerian Navy. NIMASA, he stressed, is primarily responsible for maritime safety and compliance with international protocols such as the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, rather than direct security enforcement. He stated that the Navy, on the other hand, is designed to address external aggression in deep waters and should only support other agencies upon request, rather than leading commercial inspections.
The expert concluded that the country’s maritime domain remains vulnerable, largely due to institutional neglect, inadequate coordination among relevant agencies, and an overemphasis on economic gains over national security. Addressing the issue, he said, would require a comprehensive review of existing structures, proper inter-agency collaboration, and immediate investment in modern surveillance technology.
“Operators know that no one is inspecting these vessels. So they bring in anything they like. We’ve arrested people trying to traffic drugs out of the country through airports, but rarely have we caught the vessels that brought them in through the sea. That’s a red flag. A ship loiters in our waters, then sails off with a deadly cargo to another nation. If anything goes wrong, Nigeria could be held responsible for issuing clearance. We must scrutinize every document Customs gives out.
“We’ve over-involved the Navy in commercial activities they are not trained for. They don’t know merchant vessels. Their job is to respond to external aggression or when called upon by other agencies during distress, not to lead inspections. The water is loose, and criminals know it. Until we take serious steps and stop misplacing priorities, the Gulf of Guinea will remain a soft target for terrorists and transnational criminals” Oyewole asserted.
On his part, a chieftain of the National Task Force on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Major Segun Ibikunle (Rtd) said that the growing complexity of Nigeria’s security challenges, especially within its maritime domain, may require a shift in strategy similar to what has been implemented in parts of northern Nigeria.
Speaking on the current state of maritime and national security, Ibikunle noted that the Nigerian Navy alone cannot provide all the protection needed on the nation’s waterways, just as the Army and Police have increasingly found it difficult to contain threats on land. In response to these gaps, he recalled how the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) has been empowered in the North to support conventional forces, with some of its members bearing automatic weapons to help repel terrorist activities.
However, he cautioned against a direct replication of this strategy in the Niger Delta and other coastal regions, stressing that the area remains the economic heartbeat of the country. Introducing armed non-state actors into such a sensitive environment, he warned, could trigger instability that would be difficult to contain.
Despite this, Ibikunle acknowledged that the national security landscape is changing rapidly. He said what may be deemed unacceptable today, such as arming local maritime defence groups, might become necessary tomorrow as threats evolve and traditional forces remain overstretched.
“Our Navy cannot provide all the security needed by citizens in our waters just as the Nigerian Army and Police are finding it difficult to provide the all security needed on land and are currently being assisted by the Civilian JTF in some states in the North. Though some members of the Civilian JTF operating in the North are armed with automatic weapons, but such may not be allowed currently in the Niger Delta because it is the economic live wire of the nation and allowing just anybody to carry such weapons can easily resort in chaos which would be difficult to manage” Ibikunle said.
All efforts to get the Director of Naval Information and spokesperson for the Nigerian Navy, Commodore Aiwuyor Augustine Adams-Aliu to speak on this proved abortive as calls and text messages sent to him were not responded to as at press time.
