Principles and Goals of Port Security
The goal of port security is to establish an environment in which trade may be conducted with reasonably high assurance of being unencumbered by criminal activity and without becoming a conduit for such activity. A port security department should strive to constrict the opportunities for criminal exploitation of the maritime transportation system, its providers and users. In developing a security program, the emphasis should be placed on deterring, preventing, detecting, and reducing the losses attributed to criminal activities. In order to do so, port security operations must be proactive rather than merely reactive. This requires intelligence and investigative coordination with law enforcement agencies and the security departments of the maritime industry companies utilizing a port=s facilities.
Port security must also be capable of assessing threats to the port, and responding appropriately to those threats. Therefore, the port security department must be proactive in its thinking rather than reactive. Port security must employ all forms of intelligence information, promote awareness within the port community, conduct training, practice preparedness, and exercise security plans. The goal should be to identify processes and procedures that can be implemented while adapting to a changing environment.
Port Management and Security Planning
Port security must become a planning priority in port operations, commanding the attention and resources of senior port management. While responsibility and accountability for port security goals and principles rest with the director of the port, the manager of the port security department, and the officers of the port security force, all persons within the port community must undertake a commitment to its implementation and success. The port’s mercantile operations of moving cargo and passengers are especially sensitive to the effectiveness of security operations.
Port operations and security at a marine terminal involve extensive and detailed planning considerations that must be coordinated with the ports security program. There must be a level of consistency between a ports operational policies and procedures and its security program. Effective port security is achieved by integrating port planning and operations functions with port security. In this way, the port’s business and security goals are developed through a planning process involving mutual perception of requirements. It is through this planning and coordination that the successful implementation of a ports security plan and the operational objectives are achieved.
Port Security Planning Cycle
Essential to port security planning is the ability to document and measure evidence of security threats, vulnerabilities, loss control, and the success of security measures implemented. This necessitates a system for monitoring implementation results and evaluations as a continuing process for improving a ports security effectiveness. The identification of these measures is critical to a port security service gaining budgetary and organizational support.
A security planning cycle is both strategic and tactical in nature, making it a dynamic process subject to adjustment as operational circumstances demand. The element of change necessitates that the security planning cycle be a continuous process. It requires intelligence information inputs to analyze security threat conditions, as well as an assessment of vulnerabilities and an evaluation of the suitability of security countermeasures being implemented.
Security Survey and Risk Assessment
Ultimately, the port security planning process must develop and implement measures to reduce port vulnerabilities. Unless there is recognition of potential vulnerabilities, appropriate countermeasures cannot be developed. Port security management must be capable of ascertaining the nature and magnitude of all foreseeable security threats to the ports operations. Consequently, a comprehensive security survey is the first task in the process of establishing an effective port security regime.
The security survey should be comprehensive in order to enable a complete and accurate analysis of the ports vulnerabilities. In addition to identifying the current and potential vulnerabilities to which the port’s operations are exposed, it should be compiled in a manner that makes it possible to measure the frequency and severity of exploitation of those vulnerabilities. Analysis of the information compiled in the survey will assist in the selection of various security measures to best counter potential losses and to monitor the effectiveness of countermeasures.
Port Security Plan
All port authorities should establish and implement a comprehensive port security plan and associated policies and procedures. Further, the port on a regular basis should exercise the plan. In developing the plan for implementing port security operations, the following criteria should be considered: (a) the port’s vulnerability to potential threats, (b) the effect of security measures on the port’s efficiency and operations, (c) practical limitations imposed by physical characteristics of port infrastructure, (d) availability of funds, (e) alternative measures available, and (f) evaluation of all available security capabilities, internal and external.
Where applicable, the elements of a port security plan should be carried out in coordination with such entities as the nation’s coast guard, customs service, port authority, local law enforcement authorities, harbor master, marine terminal operators, etc. Documentation for these activities should be part of the port security plan, and should be integrated and consistent with the other portions of the plan pertaining to standards.
Port Security Operations:
Implementation of the Port Security Plan One of the keys to successful implementation of any port security program is support of senior management. Another key is the commitment of port personnel. Port personnel will generally be more interested in the successful implementation of a security plan if senior management has authorized and supports its development. A third key is integration of security into the ports overall management, planning, and operations.
The operations of ports worldwide are similar; however, each has its own unique activities and trade circumstances. These differences affect not only the vulnerabilities of a port but the countermeasures that should be implemented. It is essential that port management and staff be directly and thoroughly familiar with the port’s facilities, operations, and plans. Accomplishing this requires a cooperative working relationship between security personnel and personnel responsible for the port’s general management and operations.
Port Security Measures and Procedures
The tactical responsibilities of port security apply to the vessels, cargoes, passengers, and the installations of the port facility itself, such as buildings, equipment, and trade information. The measures and procedures employed, therefore, must be adequate to counter the threat within the context of the physical port facility and its operational environment.
The essential components of port security measures and procedures should be structured to include land side operations and marine patrols in the harbors, anchorages, and waterways of ports to: (a) control access to the port, its installations, and vessels, (b) control access to cargo or passengers while in the port, (c) prevent sabotage to vessels calling at the port, to port facility installations, and to the port’s business and trade information systems.
Physical Access Control
The importance of controlling the physical access to the port facility, its installations, and cargo is paramount. Once physical access has been achieved by criminals, cargo can be stolen or subjected to various forms of exploitation. In addition to exploiting cargo, other illicit activities can occur within the port. These activities may include smuggling of weapons, drugs, currency, contraband goods, and stowaways, or even the placement of an explosive device within a containerized shipment. Further, breaches in security that allow criminals electronic access to cargo documentation makes criminal exploitation easier, particularly with the collusion of seemingly legitimate companies fronting for criminal enterprises.
Port security operations may necessitate the ability to take up positions at all entry points, open storage areas, and warehouses throughout the port and inspect the identification papers of arriving workers. It may also include being capable of controlling the movements of trucks transporting cargo through the port, and searching containers, warehouses, and ships in port as well as in the anchorage awaiting a berth.
Information Security
Port security must be prepared to counter not only threats posed by physical access to a port but also access to information. Unauthorized access to information used by a port in the conduct of its business can be exploited just as effectively as access to the port itself.
Access to information, such as the contents of containers, is a growing problem in the area of maritime security. Port security programs must address methods and procedures for ensuring information security.
Port Security Training
Lack of training is one of the most common deficiencies in any security organization. A marine terminal may increase its liability exposure not only for failing to implement reasonable security measures but for failing to properly train its personnel in effective security measures.
Becoming effective in implementing port security measures and procedures requires competent training. Training of the port security force and supervision of daily security operations are two of the most important responsibilities of port security management.
Training should include programs to train the trainer. This action creates a force multiplier effect that will in turn produce more security-trained port officials. Port security departments should seek the establishment of regional port security training centers with cooperation of national and international organizations, where port officials, law enforcement, and customs personnel can receive training.
Personnel
The true base of any security program will be the personnel selected to institute that program. Port organizations must make those efforts necessary to ensure that the ports security personnel are a competent and professional force. While many of the items mentioned earlier in this section will assist in the development of competencies within personnel, ports must also consider the level of professionalism that they desire of their security personnel. This will include such items as making a determination on whether security personnel should be sworn law enforcement officers and conducting background checks on personnel before hiring. Port management must also make the security personnel aware of their importance to the successful operations of the port.
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74 DAYS AFTER: NIMASA BEGINS REMOVAL OF 16 SHIPS
About 74 days after they were washed ashore by what experts have explained as a squall which resulted in a rough sea and strong winds, efforts have now commenced towards removing the 16 ships from Lagos waters, so says the director general, Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA), Mr Temisan Omatseye.
The squall which swept through Lagos waters on the night of February 14, 2010 forced the ships to drift from the Lagos anchorage into light house beach spread over five nautical miles, a development which at a point generated bad blood between NIMASA and owners of the affected ships; especially the Indigenous Shipowners Association of Nigeria (ISAN).
A squall is a sudden, strong and violent wind which occurs during rain or snow storms. A squall also occurs within a reasonable kilometre radius, but often leaves heavy devastation on its trail.
At least 10 of the ships were forced to the beach side, while six others were moved by the storm to the Lekki area of Lagos.
The ships included: Hollgan Star, a coastal tanker, Arcturus No. 3, an LPG tanker, Morlap Trader and Sunshine also an LPG tanker. Others are: Penil, whose hull is heavily covered with marine growth, Odyssey (ex Whitkirk); both coastal tanker, F.K Badmus; also a coastal vessel which was found flat on keel with its bow facing the beach, Ella L, a coastal vessel found sitting on top of another older wreck which had been in the same position earlier and an unidentified coastal tanker.
Some of the affected ships had been classified by NIMASA as unseaworthy and declared them as abandoned by their ‘unknown’ owners.
When the matter was still very hot, indigenous ship owners had accused NIMASA of incompetence in its operations because, according to the association’s chairman, Chief Isaac Jolapamo, in other maritime administrations, there would have been a long enough notice that a disaster of that magnitude was on its way. He had accused the maritime safety agency of failing to alert ships and that even when the squall started, all distress calls that were sent to NIMASA through the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) were unanswered.
But, the NIMASA helmsman explained that whatever disagreement that arose between the agency and ISAN has been resolved and that experts have already surveyed the situation and that those ships that could still be removed and salvaged would be attended to and that those that could not be salvaged may be scrapped.
He gave no details as to the identity of the salvaging company, but confirmed that as at last week, preliminary works on the exercise.
“ISAN and NIMASA have decided on the one that can be salvaged and the one hat can not be saved will be wrecked there on the beach”, added.
GULF OF MEXICO OIL SPILL
• Experts Say Its ‘Five Times’ Larger Than Estimated
US coastguard says 5,000 barrels a day of oil are spewing from a well beneath site of the Deepwater Horizon rig explosion.
Five times more oil a day than previously believed is spewing into the Gulf of Mexico from the blown-out well of the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig, the US coastguard has said.
The Deepwater Horizon exploded on 20 April 2010 and sank two days later off the coast of Louisiana. There were 126 people on the rig when the incident occurred. Eleven are missing and presumed dead, 17 were injured, three of them critically, and one injured person remains in hospital. A significant oil slick is now reportedly heading towards the coast of Louisiana.
Coastguard Rear Admiral Mary Landry said National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) experts now estimate that 5,000 barrels a day of oil are spilling into the gulf – far more than the previous estimate of 1,000 barrels a day. Robot submarines have so far failed to shut off the flow, 1,500m (5,000ft) below the surface, but the coastguard said a test burn on an isolated area of the spill was successful.
The revision came after a new leak was discovered and strong winds were forecast which NOAA said would push the oil towards the US shoreline.
However Doug Suttle, chief operating officer for BP, disputed the new estimates yesterday, pointing to a diagram that plotted the leaks and saying he did not believe the amount of oil spilling into the water was higher than earlier approximations.
Landry stuck to the NOAA estimate and said it was based on aerial surveys, study of the trajectory of the oil slick and other factors.
Landry added that the US president, Barack Obama, had been briefed on the revised estimate, and said the government had offered to have the defence department help contain the spill and protect the US shoreline and wildlife.
Both Landry and BP said the first test burn had been successful, although neither gave any indication as to when further burns were planned.
Crews had planned to use a 150m fire-resistant boom to collect several thousand gallons of the thickest oil on the surface, tow it to a remote area, set it on fire, and allow it to burn for about an hour. When the flames go out hardened tar is left in the water, which can be removed using nets or skimmers.
BP said more than 30,000m of boom had so far been assigned to contain the spill, with an additional 87,000m available and 97,000m on order.
The oil spill response team had recovered 16,311 barrels (2.5m litres) of an oil-water mix, and 69 response vessels were being used, the company added.
"We are attacking this spill on all fronts, bringing into play all and any resources and advanced technologies we believe can help," said Tony Hayward, BP chief executive.
"Our action plan is safety-focused, multi-layered and has the full resources of the BP Group behind it."
He added: "The scale of the surface response is truly unprecedented, both for BP and for the oil industry."
BP said it had begun preparations to drill a relief well, approximately half a mile from the main well; however NOAA said this would not be complete for several months.
NOAA said workers had finished fabricating the containment chamber of a "collection dome" which would be used to collect oil as it escaped from the well.
"Work will now begin on the piping system that brings the oil to the surface for collection; this method has never been tried at this depth before," the organisation said.
It said evaluations were under way to assess the damage caused by the oil to fish, marine mammals and sensitive resources, and warned the spill was on the move.
"Winds are forecast to become strong (20+ knots) and blow from the south-east starting tomorrow and continuing through the weekend, which will continue to push surface oil towards shore," NOAA said.
BA said costs for containing the spill were running at $6m (£3.9m) a day, and it would spend a further $100m drilling the relief well. Industry officials say replacing the Deepwater Horizon, which was owned by Transocean Ltd but operated by BP, would cost up to $700m.
Meanwhile, the US coast guard has said it will set fire to an oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico on Wednesday as efforts to stem a leak after a rig blast are failing.
Officials are concerned that, unless controlled, the leak could cause one of the worst spills in US history.
Coast Guard Rear Adm Mary Landry has said work on sealing leaks using robotic submersibles could take months.
HISTORY’S 10 MOST FAMOUS OIL SPILLS
• Amoco Cadiz
The Amoco Cadiz encountered stormy weather and ran aground off the coast of Brittany, France on March 16, 1978. Its entire cargo of 68.7 million gallons of oil spilled into the sea, polluting about 200 miles of Brittany’s coastline.
• Arabian Gulf Spills
Beginning in late January of the 1991 Gulf War, the Iraqi Army destroyed tankers, oil terminals, and oil wells in Kuwait, causing the release of about 900,000,000 barrels of oil. This was the largest oil spill in history.
• Argo Merchant
On December 15, 1976, the Argo Merchant ran aground on Fishing Rip (Nantucket Shoals), 29 nautical miles southeast of Nantucket Island, Massachusetts in high winds and ten foot seas. Six days later, the vessel broke apart and spilled its entire cargo of 7.7 million gallons of No. 6 fuel oil.
• Barge Bouchard 155
On August 10, 1993, three ships collided in Tampa Bay, Florida: the barge Bouchard 155, the freighter Balsa 37, and the barge Ocean 255. The Bouchard 155 spilled an estimated 336,000 gallons of No. 6 fuel oil into Tampa Bay.
• Barge Cibro Savannah
on March 6, 1990, the Cibro Savannah exploded and caught fire while departing the pier at the Citgo facility in Linden, New Jersey. About 127,000 gallons of oil remained unaccounted for after the incident. No one knows how much oil burned and how much spilled into the environment.
• Burmah Agate
On November 1, 1979, the Burmah Agate collided with the freighter Mimosa southeast of Galveston Entrance in the Gulf of Mexico. The collision caused an explosion and a fire on the Burmah Agate that burned until January 8, 1980. An estimated 2.6 million gallons of oil were released into the environment, and another 7.8 million gallons were consumed by the fire.
• Exxon Valdez
On March 24, 1989, the Exxon Valdez ran aground on Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound, Alaska. The tanker was travelling outside the normal shipping lanes in an attempt to avoid ice. It spilled 10.8 million gallons of oil (out of a total cargo of 53 million gallons) into the marine environment, and impacted more than 1,100 miles of non-continuous Alaskan coastline. State and Federal agencies continue to monitor the effects of this spill, which was the largest oil spill in U.S. history
• Ixtoc I
The 2-mile-deep exploratory well, Ixtoc I, blew out on June 3, 1979 in the Bay of Campeche off Ciudad del Carmen, Mexico. By the time the well was brought under control in March, 1980, an estimated 140 million gallons of oil had spilled into the bay. The Ixtoc I spill is currently #2 on the all-time list of largest oil spills of all time
• Jupiter
On September 16, 1990, the tank vessel Jupiter was offloading gasoline at a refinery on the Saginaw River near Bay City, Michigan, when a fire started on board and the vessel exploded.
• Megaborg
The Megaborg released 5.1 million gallons of oil as the result of a lightering accident and subsequent fire. The incident occurred 60 nautical miles south-southeast of Galveston, Texas on June 8, 1990.
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