Ship, Port and Supply Chain Security Concepts

Ship and port security need to be addressed, as security legislations for this specific mode  of transport are already in place since several years; this both at international level (the ISPS-Code), in the United States (e.g. Container Security Initiative, 24h-manifest, C-TPAT), and in the European Union (e.g. 725/2004, 65/2005). It was well under-stood that port security has to be focused as sea ports are the gateway from/to hinterland territories and supply vital cargo flows to the customers.
Hinterland transport including all (inter-modal respectively multimodal) transport and logis-tics processes from/to sea ports forms the most essential interface between maritime and land-surface transport modes like road, rail and Inland Water-way Transport (IWT). Until today, for this section of transport flows there is no security legislation in place. However, some security initiatives (e.g. 79/2006, 787/2006) are currently under preparation. Besides these initiatives, one has to bear in mind that also the prevailing US/EU-security legislations, which have been issued for other specific modes (e.g. maritime security), have indirect effects on hinterland processes.

Following, freight transport security affairs with respect to ship and port security will be described and analyzed.

Security threats in maritime transport and sea ports
OECD (2003) declared that perhaps foremost among the risk factors associated with maritime transport is the sheer volume and numbers of goods transported by sea. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimates that 5.8 billion tons of goods were traded by sea in 2001. This accounts for over 80% of world trade through the world. In addition to its size, the maritime sector, by its nature as a complex, international open transport network, poses several additional challenges from security standpoint. One of these is the multiplicity of terrorist risk factors associated with shipping. Moreover it declared that sea-going vessels can be the vector for, or target of, attacks. They can also serve to facilitate other attacks and/or raise revenues for terrorist organizations. The principal risk factors related to shipping cargo, vessels, people and financing – are also linked to broader risk of major disruptions in world trade and increased economic costs linked to heightened security.
Rand (2003) discovered that approximately 90% of all cargo moves in containers. Approximately 250 million containers are shipped annually. This massive flow of containers around the world is the driving force of the world’s economy. Thus, the global shipping system is a critical infrastructure for the global economy, it is, how-ever, also very vulnerable. Estimates are that the con-tents of less than 2% of all containers are checked to verify that what is inside these containers is actually what is said to be inside the containers. In fact, containers are used by criminals to transport all sorts of banned goods, even people. The problem of the illegal transport of goods and people takes on particularly worrying proportions in light of recent terrorist activities. Terrorists could, use containers to transport dangerous materials, weapons, or use the containers themselves as weapons of mass destruction. The potential threat of terrorists using containers poses a large risk to our economies and to our societies.
Seaport security receives substantial focus because seaports have been widely regarded as vulnerable to attack. One reason is that the nation’s seaports play a vital role in the nation’s economy and national security. A second reason that seaports are potentially vulnerable is the wide range of targets and attack possibilities they encompass. Facilities such as container terminals, where containers are transferred between ships and railroad cars or trucks, must be able to screen vehicles entering the facility and routinely check cargo. Chemical factories and other installations where hazardous materials are present must be able to control access to areas containing dangerous goods or hazardous substances. Vessels, ranging from oil tankers and freighters to tugboats and passenger ferries or cruise ships, must be able to restrict access to onboard areas, such as the bridge or other control stations critical to the vessels’ operation. Possible terrorist scenarios range from the use of improvised explosive devices to attack ferries to the use of recreational boats to ram key infrastructure in and around ports, according to the United States Government Accountability Office (2005).