* SOCOTRA 1: Seized on Dec. 25, 2009 in the Gulf of Aden. Yemeni-owned ship has six Yemeni crew.
* ICEBERG 1: Seized on March 29, 2010. Roll-on roll-off vessel taken 10 miles from Aden. 24 crew.
* JIH-CHUN TSAI 68: Taiwanese fishing vessel seized on March 30. 14 crew: Taiwanese captain, two Chinese and 11 Indonesians.
* RAK AFRIKANA: Seized on April 11. The St Vincent and the Grenadines-flagged 7,561-dwt cargo ship was taken 280 miles west of Seychelles..
* Three Thai fishing vessels — PRANTALAY 11, 12 and 14 — hijacked on April 17-18. 77 crew.
* TAI YUAN 227: Taiwanese fishing boat seized on May 6: 24 crew — nine Chinese, three Vietnamese, three Filipinos, seven Kenyans and two from Mozambique.
* AL-DHAFIR: Seized on May 7. Fishing boat seized off Yemen. Seven Yemeni crew.
* MOTIVATOR: Seized on July 4. Marshall Islands-flagged 13,065-dwt tanker hijacked in Red Sea. 18 Filipino crew.
* SUEZ: Seized on Aug. 2. Panama-flagged cargo ship hijacked in the Gulf of Aden. Carrying cement. 23 crew from Egypt, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and India.
* OLIB G: Seized on Sept. 8. Maltese-flagged merchant vessel with 18 crew — 15 Georgians, three Turks.
* ASPHALT VENTURE: Seized on Sept. 29: The 3,884-dwt bitumen carrier was heading to Durban from Mombasa. 15 Indian crew.
* GOLDEN WAVE: Seized on Oct. 9. South Korean fishing vessel with 43 crew: 39 Kenyans, two Koreans and two Chinese.
* IZUMI: Seized on Oct. Panama-flagged ship was en route to Mombasa with cargo of steel. 20 Filipino crew.
* YORK: Seized on Oct. 23: Singapore-flagged, Greek managed, 5,076-dwt LPG tanker seized 50 miles from Mombasa. Ship empty after discharging cargo in Mombasa. 17 crew — German master, two Ukrainians, 14 Filipinos.
* CHOIZIL: Seized on Oct. 26. South-African owned yacht was hijacked after leaving Dar es Salaam. European Union anti-piracy task force rescued one South African but two other crew members were taken ashore as hostages.
* AL-NASSR: Seized Oct. 28. Motorised dhow captured off Yemeni island of Socotra.
* POLAR: Seized on Oct 30: Liberian-owned Panama-flagged 72,825 tonne tanker seized 580 miles east of Socotra. 24 crew — one Romanian, three Greeks, four Montenegrins, 16 Filipinos.
* ALY ZULFECAR: Seized on Nov. 2. Comorian passenger boat was taken inside Tanzania’s territorial waters. Nine crew — one Tanzanian, four Comorians, four from Madagascar. Also 12 Tanzanian and 8 Comorian passengers.
* HANNIBAL II: Seized on Nov. 11. Panama-flagged chemical tanker was taken 860 miles east of Horn of Africa. The 24,105-tonne vessel was sailing to Suez from Malaysia carrying vegetable oil. 31 crew — 23 Tunisians, four Filipinos, a Croat, a Georgian, a Russian and a Moroccan.
* YUAN XIANG: Seized on Nov. 12. Chinese-owned cargo ship captured off Oman. 29 Chinese crew.
* ALBEDO: Seized on Nov. 26. Malaysian-owned cargo vessel was taken 900 miles off Somalia as it headed for Mombasa from UAE. 23 crew — from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Iran.
* JAHAN MONI: Seized on Dec. 5. Merchant ship was 1,300 miles east of Somalia en route from Indonesia to Greece via Singapore carrying nickel ore. 26 crew.
* PANAMA: Seized on Dec. 10: Liberian-flagged container ship en route from Tanzania to Beira. 23 crew from Myanmar.
* RENUAR: Seized on Dec. 11: Liberian-owned bulk cargo vessel, 70,156 dwt, captured en route to Fujairah from Port Louis. 24 Filipino crew.
* ORNA: Seized on Dec. 20: The Panama-flagged bulk cargo vessel, 27,915 dwt, owned by the United Arab Emirates, was seized 400 miles northeast of the Seychelles.
* THOR NEXUS: Seized on Dec. 25: Thai-registered 20,377-dwt bulk carrier was hijacked 350 miles off Oman. 27 crew, all Thai.
* EMS RIVER: Seized on Dec. 27. The Antigua and Barbuda-flagged ship 5,200-dwt cargo vessel had about eight crew and was captured in the Gulf of Aden as it headed towards the Suez Canal.
* SHIUH FU NO 1: Somali pirates appear to have seized the Taiwanese-owned fishing vessel near the northeast tip of Madagascar in the Indian Ocean. The vessel, with a crew of 26 Taiwanese, Chinese and Vietnamese nationals, reported being under pirate attack on Dec. 25, the EU Naval Force said.
* VEGA 5: Somali pirates hijacked the Mozambican-flagged fishing vessel about 200 nautical miles (370 km) southwest of the Comoros Islands in the Indian Ocean. The ship, with 14 crew of unknown nationalities, was seen towing what looked like a pirate attack skiff on Dec. 31.
* BLIDA: The 20,586-tonne Algerian-flagged bulk carrier was seized on Jan. 1 about 150 nautical miles southeast of Salalah, Oman, the EU Naval Force said. The ship, with 27 crew from Algeria, Ukraine and the Philippines, was heading to Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, from Salalah with a cargo of clinker.
Sources: Reuters/Ecoterra International/International Maritime Bureau Piracy Reporting Centre/Lloyds List/Inquirer.net/www.eunavfor.eu
SHIPTALK: A Glossary Of Shipping And Maritime Terms
DUNNAGE: Wood or other material used in stowing ship cargo to prevent its movement.
FENDER PILES: The wooden or plastic pilings on the outer edge of the wharf function like the fenders on a car. They are there to absorb the shock of a ship as it docks at the wharf and to protect the structural pilings that actually support the wharf. Fender piles are also called sacrifice piles since they are designed to be discarded after they are broken.
FLEETING: The area at which barges, towboats and tugs are berthed until needed. The operation of building or dismantling barge tows.
LENGTH OVERALL (LOA): Linear measurement of a vessel from bow to stern.
Lift On-Lift Off (LO/LO): Cargo handling technique involving transfer of commodities to and from the ship using shore side cranes or ship’s gear.
MARINE SURVEYOR: Person who inspects a ship hull or its cargo for damage or quality.
MASTER: The officer in charge of the ship. "Captain" is a courtesy title often given to a master.
FREIGHT FORWARDER: An individual or company that prepares the documentation and coordinates the movement and storage of export cargoes
LANDLORD PORT: At a landlord port, the port authority builds the wharves, which it then rents or leases to a terminal operator (usually a stevedoring company). The operator invests in cargo-handling equipment (forklifts, cranes, etc), hires long shore labourers to operate such lift machinery and negotiates contracts with ocean carriers (steamship services) to handle the unloading and loading of ship cargoes
GROSS TONNAGE: The sum of container, breakbulk and bulk tonnage
MEAN LOW WATER (MLW): Lowest average level water reaches on an outgoing tide.
MEAN HIGH WATER (MHW): Highest average level water reaches on an outgoing tide.
MOORING DOLPHIN: A cluster of pilings to which a boat or barge ties up.
Philippines Says nation Attained Zero Maritime Causality In 2010
Due to the Philippine government’s more proactive preparations, greater maritime safety awareness, and improved security policies and facilities, the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) “virtually attained” zero maritime casualties it had aimed in the local shipping industry last year.
Admiral Wilfredo Tamayo, PCG commandant, said that the notable decrease in the number of maritime incidents in 2010 is largely attributed not only to the less number of storms and other weather disturbances which had entered the Philippine archipelago but also on the Coast Guard’s maritime communications system in which they have sustained operational readiness and strategic deployment of maritime search and rescue (SAR) and disaster response assets.
“More integrated early warning and recall system for the shipping industry and local fishermen had been implemented during adverse weather conditions, and stronger partnership and cooperation among major maritime agencies and partner nations,” Tamayo said.
He added that the PCG had responded and rendered assistance to more than 750,500 persons and only listed a total of 240 casualties in some isolated incidents which occurred last year.
Tamayo also mentioned that they have saved a total of 9,577 lives in their 597 SAR missions conducted in 2010.
The PCG had also collected more than 1,930 tons of garbage along the coastlines they had maintained and inspected last year.
“Most of the maritime incidents that happened last year involved international flagged vessels particularly in Northern Luzon, and we are happy that no major incidents happened in the local shipping industry unlike in 2009,” Tamayo said
SAFETY 2
CAPTION:
IMB Digital Imaging Showing The Total Number Of Piracy Attacks Between January And September, 2010
*Courtesy: IMB
WEEKLY PIRACY REPORT
01.01.2011:
2123 UTC: Posn: 14:53.0N – 063:45.9E, about 575 nm east of Socotra island, (Off Somalia).
Pirates armed with guns chased and fired upon a tanker underway. The master increased speed, took evasive manoeuvres and managed to evade the attempted boarding.
01.01.2011:
1536 UTC: Posn: 15:28N – 055:51E, around 130nm SE Salalah, Oman (Off Somalia).
Armed pirates attacked and hijacked a bulk carrier underway.
01.01.2011:
1950 UTC: Posn: 02:41N – 059:17E, Off Somalia.
Armed pirates chased a tug underway. The tug released the barge it was towing to increase speed and manoeuvrability. Security team onboard fired flares. The skiffs later aborted the attack and rejoined a previously hijacked vessel.
01.01.2010:
1321 UTC: Posn: 13:09N – 048:49E, Gulf of Aden.
Six pirates in a skiff chased, fired upon and attempted to board a chemical tanker underway. Due to evasive manoeuvres and effective anti piracy measures, the hijack was evaded.
01.01.2011:
0754 UTC: Posn: 03:56N – 59:33E: around 672nm east of Hobyo, Somalia.
Twelve armed pirates in two skiffs chased and fired upon an anchor handling tug underway. Due to evasive manoeuvres and effective anti piracy measures the hijack was evaded. Suspected pirates mother ship
02.01.2011:
1055 UTC: Posn: 15:29.0N – 059:23.6E, 320 nm ESE of Salalah, Oman.(Off Somalia).
Two skiffs chased a general cargo ship underway. Master raised alarm, increased speed, took evasive manoeuvres and crew threw empty drums to deter the skiffs. Finally, the skiffs stopped chasing the ship.
03.01.2010:
1039 UTC: Posn: 15:48N – 059:49E, around 330nm ESE of Salalah, Oman (Off Somalia).
Pirates in two skiffs chased, attacked and boarded a chemical tanker underway. Crew have locked down in citadel.
Operating Procedures On International Convention On Maritime Search And Rescue
Information Concerning Emergencies
Parties shall ensure that such continuous radio watches as are deemed practicable and necessary, are maintained on international distress frequencies. A coast radio station receiving any distress call or message shall:
Immediately inform the appropriate rescue co-ordination centre or rescue sub-centre;
Rebroadcast to the extent necessary to inform ships on one or more of the international distress frequencies or on any other appropriate frequency;
Precede such rebroadcasts with the appropriate automatic alarm signals unless this has already been done; and
Take such subsequent action as decided by the competent authority.
Any authority or element of the search and rescue organization having reason to believe that a vessel is in a state of emergency should give as soon as possible all available information to the rescue co-ordination centre or rescue sub-centre concerned.
Rescue co-ordination centres and rescue sub-centres shall, immediately upon receipt of information concerning a vessel in a state of emergency, evaluate such information and determine the phase of emergency in accordance with paragraph 5.2 and the extent of operation required.
Emergency phases
For operations purposes, the following emergency phases shall be distinguished:
Uncertainty phase:
When a vessel has been reported overdue at its destination; or when a vessel has failed to make an expected position or safety report.
Alert phase:
When, following the uncertainty phase, attempts to establish contact with the vessel have failed and inquiries addressed to other appropriate sources have been unsuccessful; or
When information has been received indicating that the operating efficiency of a vessel is impaired but not to the extent that a distress situation is likely.
Distress phase:
When positive information is received that a vessel or a person is in grave and imminent danger and in need of immediate assistance; or
When, following the alert phase, further unsuccessful attempts to establish contact with the vessel and more widespread unsuccessful inquiries point to the probability that the vessel is in distress; or
When information is received which indicates that the operating efficiency of a vessel has been impaired to the extent that a distress situation is likely.
Procedures for rescue co-ordination centres and rescue sub-centres during emergency phases
1. Upon the declaration of the uncertainty phase, the rescue co-ordination centre or rescue sub-centre, as appropriate, shall initiate inquiries in order to determine the safety of the vessel or shall declare the alert phase.
2. Upon the declaration of the alert phase, the rescue co-ordination centre or rescue sub-centre, as appropriate, shall extend the inquiries for the missing vessel, alert appropriate search and rescue services and initiate such action, as described in paragraph 5.3.3, as is necessary in the light of the circumstances of the particular case.
3. Upon the declaration of the distress phase, the rescue co-ordination centre or rescue sub-centre, as appropriate, shall:
Initiate action in accordance with the arrangements set out in paragraph
Where appropriate, estimate the degree of uncertainty of the vessel’s position and determine the extent of any area to be searched;
Notify the owner of the vessel or his agent if possible and keep him informed of developments;
Notify other rescue co-ordination centres or rescue sub-centres, the help of which seems likely to be required or which may be concerned in the operation;
Request at an early stage any help which might be available from aircraft, vessels or services not specifically included in the search and rescue organization, considering that, in the majority of distress situations in ocean areas, other vessels in the vicinity are important elements for search and rescue operations;
Draw up a broad plan for the conduct of the operations from the information available and communicate such plan to the authorities designated
Amend as necessary in the light of circumstances the guidance already given
Notify the consular or diplomatic authorities concerned or, if the incident involves a refugee or displaced person, the office of the competent international organization;
Notify accident investigation authorities as appropriate; and
Notify any aircraft, vessel or other services mentioned in consultation with the authorities designated when their assistance is no longer required.
*To be continued next week
NIMASA Provides Search And Rescue Services For Third Mainland Bridge Accident Victims
The Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency, NIMASA recently provided Search and Rescue services for victims of the accident on Third Mainland Bridge in Lagos, where 2 passengers fell into the Lagos lagoon.
Distressed signals were received at the NIMASA Regional Maritime Rescue Coordination Center at Kirikiri, Lagos at about 10.00 am on the fateful day and the Search and Rescue team was immediately mobilized to the accident site.
The rescue team which was led by the Director, Maritime Safety and Seafarers Standard, Capt. Ibraheem Olugbade also included officials of the Nigerian Ports Authority and local divers.
In collaboration with officials of the Marine Police and the local divers, the NIMASA team coordinated the operation rescue operation which was tagged “ comb the area for the accident victims”.
After about one hour of intensive search, the operation was called off by the team leader who then reviewed the operation to a recovery mode with local divers empowered by NIMASA.
Local divers and eye witness commended the management of NIMASA for responding swiftly to the distress call.
Speaking shortly after the Search and Rescue operation, the Agency’s Executive Director Maritime Safety and Shipping Development, Mr. Ishaku Shekarau stated that he ordered the operation in line with the Agency’s mandate of ensuring safety on the Nigerian maritime environment.
While restating the Agency’s commitment to ensuring safety on Nigerian waterways, Mr. Shekarau urged all those who do business in the maritime environment to adhere strictly to basic safety measures in order to avoid accidents which could lead to loss of lives
Paris MoU On Port State Control Introduces New Regime
The Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control (Paris MoU) has introduced a new port state control inspection regime from January 1, 2011.
The New Inspection Regime (NIR) was developed by the Paris MoU following consultation with the industry on a mechanism to focus port State control inspections and to reward quality shipping.
The NIR was developed in cooperation with the European Union and with a significant contribution from EMSA and all of the member Authorities of the Paris MoU. The NIR requirements are aligned with the legislative requirements of the new EU Directive on Port State Control and with the national legislation of the PMoU member states. Under the NIR quality ships will be rewarded with longer inspection intervals. High risk ships will be subject to expanded inspections every six months. Ships with three or more detentions will be banned for a minimum period of three months.
Port State Control is a check on visiting foreign ships to see that they comply with international rules on safety, pollution prevention and seafarers’ living and working conditions. It is a means of enforcing compliance where the owner and flag State have failed in their responsibility to implement or ensure compliance. The port State can require defects to be put right, and detain the ship for this purpose if necessary. It is therefore also a port State’s defence against visiting substandard shipping.
Regional Port State Control was initiated in 1982 when fourteen European countries agreed to co-ordinate their port State inspection effort under a voluntary agreement. Current membership includes 27 countries. The European Commission, although not a signatory to the Paris MoU, is also a member of the Committee. The Secretariat of the MoU is provided by the Netherlands Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment and located in The Hague.
With the introduction of the NIR the PMoU will change its target of inspecting 25% of individual ships calling at each member state to a shared commitment for full coverage of inspecting all ships visiting ports and anchorages in the PMoU region as a whole.
The Target Factor will be replaced by the Ship Risk Profile. The Ship Risk Profile classifies ships into Low Risk Ships (LRS) and High Risk Ships (HRS). If a ship is neither Low Risk or High Risk it is classified as Standard Risk Ship (SRS).
Low risk ships will be awarded with longer inspection intervals by port State control – up to 36 months, compared to 6 months in the current system. High risk ships will be inspected between five and six months following their last inspection. Standard risk ships will be inspected every 10 to 12 months.
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