The International Ships and Ports facility Security (ISPS) Code embodies a comprehensive set of security measures introduced by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) following the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the U.S. It is meant to forestall a reenactment of the incident by terrorists using ports and ancillary facilities.
And about two years after the global flag-off of the code in 2004, (that is in 2006) the then-minister of transport; Dr Abiye Sekibo prided Nigeria as being the first in Africa to be the first to comply.
The International Ships and Ports facility Security (ISPS) Code embodies a comprehensive set of security measures introduced by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) following the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the U.S. It is meant to forestall a reenactment of the incident by terrorists using ports and ancillary facilities.
And about two years after the global flag-off of the code in 2004, (that is in 2006) the then-minister of transport; Dr Abiye Sekibo prided Nigeria as being the first in Africa to be the first to comply.
He had told a US Coast Guard delegation that: "Almost all the country’s oil and gas installations and other shipping facilities are ISPS code-compliant”, he added that, government has placed security agencies at the ports on full alert to avert any unlawful acts in shipping and other maritime businesses.
Perhaps playing the role of a designated authourity for the purpose of implementing the ISPS Code, the Nigerian Ports Authourity (NPA), had also (about the same time) claimed that all the nation’s ports have perimeter wall fence in order to prevent unauthorised persons from gaining entry into the port, in addition to access control gates that are manned by its security operatives. According to NPA, all the port users are properly screened at the gate to ensure that only those with port permit and those who have genuine business to carry out are allowed access to the port.
NPA goes further to state that, “the entire port premises are well-illuminated at night for the safety of the vessels in our ports. There are also back-up generators in the event of power failure. There are Closed Circuit Televisions installed all over the ports to monitor the activities of port users. The CCTV is been manned 24 hours by the Security Department and the Port Terminal Operators (PTO).”
If Nigerian ports have all these, there would have been no justification for the recent disgraceful rating by the US Coast Guard, and to follow it up with a threat to stop patronising our ports and oil terminals.
And if America had not issued the threat, it naturally means that it would have been business as usual, ISPS code or not.
In its feeble approach to flagging-off the compliance process, what the Government did was to create another organ in the name of the now-defunct Presidential Implementation Committee on Maritime Safety and Security (PICOMSS) which at a time assumed a larger than-life status in the maritime sector; accountable only to the Presidency. It was rumoured at a time that the body only succeeded as an avenue to allegedly siphon money through all means possible. However, there were attempts later in its life to actively be active as a designated authority for ISPS Code, and it actually did well before it was scrapped by the Presidency.
The nations’ failure in the issue of ISPS code compliance is traceable to the faulty and clueless start of the Presidential Implementation Committee on Maritime Safety and Security (PICOMSS).
Going by the dictates of the IMO and the details of ISPS Code, there are three levels of security that any port and other facilities must attain. Level one requires that there should be minimum, appropriate and protective security measures within the ports; the second level of security is that there should be appropriate additional protective security measures which shall be maintained for a period of time as a result of heightened risk of a security incident. Security level three is the time when there is the probable or imminent risk of a security incident. At this level, there must be further specific protective security measures for a limited period of time when a security incident is probable or imminent, although it may not be possible to identify the specific target.
But, how did we get to this level where the US Coast Guard had to demand a 'Certificate of Entry’ form ships that have had any dealings with some of the terminals in Nigerian ports and jetties, down from at least the level of almost total compliance that the then-minister of transport said we were? Or is it that Dr Sekibo was only fooling us when, in actual fact he knew that we had nothing on ground to qualify us for an ISPS Code compliant nation.
All that is history now, the Designated Authourity for ISPS Code implementation in Nigeria is NIMASA, and we sincerely sympathise with the agency for being the one to clean the rots that years of non-compliance has degenerated into.
May it be said that being compliant is not about painting our ports and putting barricades at the terminals, it’s not about putting clueless and half trained security personnel at the entry and exit points, it is also not about forming associations (we know of the existence of a group of chief security officers of the various ports and terminals who meet monthly under the aegis of Port Facility Security Officers) which have turned to a social gathering where stale information and situation reports are shared monthly rather than being proactive at their various duty posts.
Being compliant is certainly not akin to using the police and customs officers to harass hapless customs agents. If the ports adhere to the modus operandi of the ISPS code, it would have been extremely difficult seeing the army of ‘port users’ who throng in and out of the ports and who mill around the various ports daily.
But now that it has been agreed that many of our terminals and jetties are not compliant, then someone should ask questions about how the huge funds that were provided to certain officials were expended, especially in the build up to 2006.
It is nonetheless gratifying to note that a lot of ground has been covered since the US verdict; it is also noteworthy that the number of ports and terminals that have been cleared has increased significantly.
We also take note of the discovery that majority of the conventional terminals have complied, but we are also surprised that many of the oil terminals are yet to meet the minimum requirements.
Recently, NIMASA, by its own admittance said that, some terminals and facilities are yet to comply, but we hasten to state that, compliance to the ISPS code is not a one-off thing.
But, even as we sympathise with NIMASA in its efforts to bolster the level of compliance of the various facilities, we dare say that a lot more need to be done. Yes there is so much work involved; yes it only assumed responsibilities only only recently, yes, PICOMSS messed up.
We are aware that NIMASA has shown significant seriousness in the execution of its mandate as the designated authourity; it now has a department that is saddled with the responsibility of ensuring compliance. This is a quite commendable.
Discussion about this post