When the then- NMA was founded, the intention of government was to have an agency that would engineer a rapid development of the nation’s shipping and maritime sector by creating a better platform and more opportunities for indigenous shipping practitioners in sea-borne trade.
When the then- NMA was founded, the intention of government was to have an agency that would engineer a rapid development of the nation’s shipping and maritime sector by creating a better platform and more opportunities for indigenous shipping practitioners in sea-borne trade.
In a nutshell, apart from its general responsibilities for maritime safety administration, what is generally called commercial responsibilities, port and flag state control and of course, Cabotage, Nigeria’s maritime administration agency (in this case, NMA) was created to improve the lot Nigerian ship owners and other categories of operators in the sector.
And to do this, the lot has at different times fallen on at least 11 Nigerians; all of whom have fallen short in one way or the other. The 11th is in the saddle.
For those who still remember the early days of NMA; up until mid- 1990s, the agency only became an avenue for award of contracts; without consideration for execution of its mandate. The agency also became known for uncoordinated and ridiculous cargo allocation system as cargoes that would have been carried by genuine indigenous ship owners were offered to briefcase shipping companies.
Much later, a good opportunity to retrace itself was offered in the name of the Ship Acquisition and Ship Building Fund (SASBF). But, rather than judiciously managing the funds which accrued from statutory payments into the agency’s coffers, the NMA only succeeded in creating millionaires out of non-ship owning individuals.
The office of chief executive of NIMASA (and even NMA) has been over politicized. Each minister wants his own protégé to be the director general. It started towards the tail end of the tenure of Alhaji Munir Jafar’ as the director general of NMA when he was reportedly removed on the instruction of the then-Head of State (now late) General Sani Abacha who directed his minister of transport (now deceased too) Major General Ibrahim Dahiru Gumel to kick the crown prince of Zauzau Emirate in Kaduna state out. He was replaced with Alhaji Buba Galadima who was later to use NMA to fund the allegedly transmutation campaign of late General Abacha.
From Buba, the agency has had John Egesi, Dr George Eneh, Ferdinand Agu (an Architect), Festus Ugwu (an engineer), and Mrs Mfon Ekong Usoro (a maritime lawyer) and Dosunmu (a PhD holder in public administration, Mr Temisan and now, Mr Ziakede Akpobolokemi).
About 25 years of NMA and about five years of NIMASA and with seven and four chief executive officers respectively, it is apt to take stock of a few things and draw conclusions.
First, would the maritime industry have been better-off without the merger of both NMA and the then-Joint Maritime Labour Industrial Council (JOMALIC). In other words, did the merger overwhelm subsequent chief executives? Is NIMASA suffering from the carry-over of its ineptitude while it was called NMA? Is it true that from NMA to NIMASA, the problem has been with the appointment of non-professionals to manage the nation’s apex maritime regulatory agency? Are all these posers collectively responsible for the high turn over of chief executives of the agency?
Since 2003, the merger of JOMALIC and NMA has put a burden on their off-shoot, so much so that successive chief executives have had to swing between expectations of their ‘god fathers’ and the industry that they have been appointed to serve.
Sadly, when examined from the angel of its core mandates which are: shipping development, maritime labour, safety (which has now included security), Cabotage and so on, the verdict of most stakeholders is that NIMASA has performed below average.
The multitude of seafarers who are unemployed apparently because they are ill-equipped and the continuous lamentations of dockworkers over their conditions of service is a pointer to the fact that maritime education and training is not being given adequate attention.
Thinking that with the Cabotage Act in the kitty, indigenous seafarers were the most optimistic that their lots would be enhanced, but how wrong they were, as nine years down the line, there is really nothing to cheer, little wonder that they clamoured for a review(as if it would solve the problems). Rather than enhance the nation’s tonnage, the number and quality of indigenous ships have nose-dived since 2003.
The most obvious minus for NIMASA in the discharge of its mandate is the unending wave of piracy off the coast of Nigeria and the unbridled robbery within her territorial waters. And in an admittance of its being overwhelmed NIMASA has tried all sorts; including signing a Memorandum of Understanding with the Navy and lately concessioning maritime security to a private outfit.
It is appropriate and timely at this time in the history of NIMASA to advice that a much-more purpose-driven approach to the fulfillment of its mandate should be embraced. The incumbent DG has not shown enough grasp of this and we advice that he should surround himself with knowledgeable technocrats who can assist him, after all, his retention as chief executive should be a renewed confidence in his ability to ‘deliver’.
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